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“I am concerned and I am frustrated because I don’t know what the alternates are…
It clearly isn’t racist; its economics. The real question you have to ask yourself is: Is this
good or bad?”
Norman Rice, former Mayor of Seattle
On gentrification in that city.2
Introduction and Scope
Urban America is in a state of crisis. A huge pool of America’s resources is
increasingly disconnected from mainstream society.3 That pool is within the core of
major cities and particularly includes African American and Hispanic male youth.4 By
way of illustration, more than half of all core city African American men do not finish
high school. The correlation between drop-out rates, unemployment, and incarceration is
profound. As of 2004, 72% of African American dropouts who are in their 20’s are
unemployed, up from 65% in 2000.5 Incarceration levels are at historic highs and
increasing, where by their mid-30’s, 6 in 10 of these high school drop outs have spent
time in prison.6 That rate is four times higher than that of Black men in South Africa
under the apartheid regime.7 Seventy five percent of African American males
incarcerated in Baltimore Maryland did not graduate from high school.8 The infant
mortality rate among all African Americans is more than twice the national average, and
is much worse among the poor in the core of urban America.9 After the Katrina
floodwaters have receded, some see an opportunity to buy low and sell high. But the
muted voices of the poor cry to keep what they had.10 For them it was a Katrina moment.
2

Blaine Harden, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/18/AR2006061800605)
(accessed June 19, 2006).
3
Andrew Sum, Challenges & Pol’y Options: Labor Market Conditions Among 16-24 Year-Old Young
Adults in Maryland and the Baltimore PMSA, Johns Hopkins University 2-3 (2001). The Sum study found
that Black and Hispanic youth in Baltimore, Maryland, are twice as likely to fall within the ethnographic
definition of “disconnected” than white youth. The term “disconnected” refers to a quantified tendency to
be out-of-school and out-of-work.
4
Id.
5
Eric Eckholm, Plight Deepens for Black Men, Studies Warn, N.Y. TIMES A1 (March 20, 2006). Eckholm
was relying on data from a panel of experts at Columbia, Princeton, and Harvard, who opined that the rate
of disconnectedness is “far” greater for these African American males than comparable white and Hispanic
men. One factor of many is the reduced market for unskilled labor.
6
Id.
7
Dash T. Douglas, A House Divided: The Social and Economic Underdevelopment of American’s Inner
Cities, 10 U. FLA. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 369, 381 (Spring 1999), citing Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation
Report, The Millennium Breach 1(1998).
8
Sum, supra at n. 2. The findings were from 1998.
9
Center for Disease Control, http://www.cdc.gov/omh/AMH/factsheets/infant.htm (accessed June 13,
2006). The national average is 6.9 deaths per 1,000 live births, but 14.1 among African Americans. That is
on par with the mortality of children from Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, see study involving the
World Health Organization and the World Bank (available at
http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2003/indicator/indic_289.html) (accessed June 13, 2006).
10
Query whether those core residents will experience economic discrimination through a Reverse
Reconstruction. The Civil War Reconstruction was designed to increase the quality of life for former slaves

11/22/2006

2

For the urban core poor across the nation, it has been a Katrina erosion over the decades
from a series of unnatural disasters.
Despite this crisis in urban America, could it be that over $2 billion of US
taxpayer dollars designed to alleviate that problem are being co-opted for the financially
well-healed? With the aid of federal subsidies, are the wealthy gentrifying the low
income areas and marginalizing the low income residents in the process? A long-time
Portland Oregon resident observed: “The heart of the black community is gone.”11
Seattle’s first and only African American mayor in the 1990’s observed the transition of
well-educated and mostly white newcomers into the city’s Central District and said: “I
am concerned and I am frustrated because I don’t know what the alternates are…It
clearly isn’t racist; its economics. The real question you have to ask yourself is: Is this
good or bad?”12 More to the point of this article, is the federal law, through the new
markets tax credit program actually subsidizing the gentrification?
The answer to the later question appears to be either an unequivocally “yes”, or
adding a drop of vacillation: “It certainly appears that way”. Metaphorically speaking,
the proof is in the plumbing. As will be detailed below the NMTC program has been used
to subsidize the development of performing arts centers for opera, ballet, symphony
orchestras, hotels, high priced condominiums, theatres, mixed use commercial
developments, and even convention centers.13 This author opines that as a matter of tax
credit policy, the needs of the desperate should trump the wants of financially wellhealed, and that the NMTC funds were not misappropriated, just misapplied in many
significant respects - a correctable error nonetheless.
The thesis of this article is the following: If tax credits are used as part of the
solution to urban ills, gentrified projects for the wealthy are not consistent with
Congressional intent or wise tax policy. The remedy is to close loopholes in the NMTC
act that have allowed problematic use of governmental subsidies, and redirect those funds
to ventures that more precisely benefit existing low income residents who are the object
of the NMTC program. 14

and their decedents. It remains to be seen whether the well educated financially well healed will be the
beneficiaries of the Post Katrina reconstruction of New Orleans and other Gulf Coast communities.
11
Harden, supra n. 2.
12
Id. One in four of the anticipated job growth in the Seattle central city is high wage and highly skilled
positions.
13
See the discussion in Part II regarding what I term “Problematic Purposed Projects”.
14
Governmental corrections are only part of what is necessary to materially improve the quality of life
among urban core residents. A larger component of urban revitalization is increasing private equity
infusion from new sources. In a pending article, this author models a reconfigured substrata of the African
American middle class that has peculiarly-crafted investment motivations (part profit, part philanthropic)
that is aligned with self help investment techniques of prior generations and other ethnic groups that have
successfully established economic enclaves (e.g. Cubans in Miami, West Indians and Koreans in Boston). I
term them “Ethnivestors”. The thesis is that such an investor group should receive tax credit subsidies over
gentrified investors because Ethnivestors provide projects more likely to be in the long term best interests
of the urban core community, thereby reducing long term governmental dependence by those communities.
Ethnivestors can be accomplished through the race-neutral amendments proposed in this article. See
Revitalizing our urban core without marginalizing our core people: Closing tax credit loopholes for the
wealthy while generating ethnic entrepreneurial self help alternatives to subsidized gentrification.
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Consistent with this thesis, Part 1 provides an overview of the regulatory
structure of the tax credit, foundational definitions and intended operational scheme. This
is to clarify that the intent of the legislation was to benefit the low income residents, not
wealthy residents who come into low income areas. Part II provides a contextual
framework for the competing models for how tax subsidies should be delivered to the
urban community, i.e. models that allow for gentrified projects and those that do not. Part
III contains proposed amendments to the legislation to close loopholes that have diverted
funds away from the low income residents of target communities.
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Part I.
(A)

NMTC Background and Regulatory Structure

To stimulate the investment of private equity capital into low income urban and
rural America, the 106th Congress in the waning years of the Clinton administration
amended the internal revenue code15 to allow a tax credit in the amount of 39% of a
taxpayer’s equity investment over a 7-year period if that taxpayer invested in low income
communities.16 And it is not an unfunded mandate. In hopes of generating $15 billion of
equity investments between 2002 and 2007, the federal treasury has authority to issue tax
credit to investors equal to 39% of that sum ($5.85 billion dollars).17 The credits are
distributed by rounds based on the size of equity commitments by qualified investor
groups. Already investments and corresponding tax credits are allocated through four of
five anticipated rounds.18 The Treasury has delegated the responsibility for distribution
and administration of the program to the Community Development Fund Institution
(“CDFI”). 19
The focus of the NMTC is to benefit low-income communities by drawing equity
capital into these target communities.20 The “draw” is a tax credit. By reducing an
investor’s tax liability, the economic return on the investment in the low income area is
increased akin to the successful Low Income Housing Tax Credit program.21 A
byproduct of the equity investment is restored commerce within those communities.22
15

On May 23, 2000, President Clinton and Speaker of the House Dennis Hastert publicly announced an
agreed proposal that led to the introduction of the Community Renewal and New Markets Act of 2000. HR
4923, 106th Cong. (2000). What emerged from the conference deliberations of both chambers was the bill
entitled The Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000 (“CRTRA”) H.R. 5662, 106th Cong. (2000).
Despite its complexity and permutations, the bill was introduced December 14, 2000, and voted on and
passed the same day. Robert W. Oast, Jr., Incentives for Economic Development in Underserved
Communities and for Affordable Housing: A Selective Look at the Legislative Initiatives in the 106th
Congress, 33 Urb. Law. 793, 795 Urban Lawyer (Summer 2001). The CRTRA was signed into law on
December 21, 2000, tucked away into obscurity within the massive appropriations act. Title I of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, PUB. L. NO. 106-569, 114 Stat. 2944 (2000) Thus, it received
little fan-fare or public attention beyond those already in the know. Actual legislative history is equally
obscure.
16
I.R.C. § 45D(a)(2)(A-B) (2004). These sections specifically provide for a credit of 5% of the equity
investment for the first 3 years, followed by a 6% credit for the remaining years.
17
I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(A-D).
18
The 2002 round equity amount was $2.5 billion. The 2003 round amount was $3.5 billion. For 2005, the
amount was $2 billion, and for 2006 the equity allocation was $3.5 billion. The 2007 equity to be raised is
$3.5 billion. See the statutory authority of I.R.C. § 45D(f)(1)(A-D) and the 2003 Accountability Report of
the US Department of Treasury, CDFI Fund at http://www.cdfifund.gov/docs/2004/2003-annual-report.pdf.
19
26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 602 (2004). Original cite included—Fed Reg. Vol. 690, No. 248 (12-28-2004).
20
Mulock, supra n. 12 at Summary. Available at
http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/Economics/econ73.cfm?&CFID=179847&CFTOKEN=80276519#_1_1 (accessed Nov. 3, 2005).
21
The Low Income Housing Tax Credit provides an approximate 9 percent tax credit for new construction
or rehabilitation expenditures for low income households over a 10-year period. See I.R.C. § 1437f.
22
Jennifer Forbes, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for Urban Revitalization: A
comparison of Empowerment Zones and New Markets Tax Credits, 2006 U. Ill. L. Rev. 177, 188 (2006),
citing statements of Rep. Rangel, 145 Cong. Rec. E1761 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999).
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The general NMTC transaction can be described as follows:
1. An investor 23must invest a qualified equity investment (“QEI”) into a qualified
community development entity (“CDE”).24
2. The CDE must then take the investor’s QEI and invest those sums into a low
income community project, either directly, or through a qualified communitybased organization (“QCB”) or other approved entities that serve the low income
area.25
3. The credit is considered for the period commencing with the date the initial
investment and each of the 6 anniversary dates thereafter.26 The credit is 5% for
the initial three years, and 6% for the remaining 4 years, equating to a 39% credit
over the total of 7 years. 27
The anchor for the tax credit ship is the CDE.28 The general scheme is that the
CDE receives the investor taxpayer’s equity investment (“QEI”)29 and redirects it (in the
form of a qualified low income community investment to a low income community
business (the QCB). It is the CDE that funnels the credits to the investors. A CDE must
satisfy three requirements. First, its primary mission must be serving, or providing
investment capital for low-income communities or low-income persons.30 Second, a CDE
must provide for low income resident representation “on any governing board of the
entity or on any advisory board to the entity”.31 Third, the Director of the CDFI must
formally certify the community development entity.32
Since the tax credit is only provided to investors in exchange for a “qualified”
equity investment, the basis of qualification is important to the scheme. The CDE must
use substantially all of the cash for qualified low-income community investments to
qualify as an equity investment33. In construing the requirement that “substantially all”
of the QEI must be for low income community investments, the final regulations provide

23

Also termed the “taxpayer” since that person is the recipient of the tax credits.
I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1).
25
Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(1)(i).
26
I.R.C. § 45 (a)(3)(A-B).
27
To illustrate the credit, assume an equity investment of $100,000 in year 1. For year 1, 2, and 3, the
credit is $5,000 (5% of $100,000) for a total of $15,000. The 6% credit on the same 100,000 investment for
the following four years is $6,000 each of the remaining four years for a total of $24,000. The combined
credit is $39,000 ($15,000 plus $24,000).
28
A qualified CDE can be any domestic corporation or partnership. I.R.C. § 45D(6)(c)(1). An individual
conducting business as a sole proprietor is excluded.
29
Reg. § 1.45D-1(b).
30
I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A).
31
I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(B).
32
I.R.C. § 45D(6)(c)(1)(C).
33
I.R.C. § 45D(b)(1)(B). The QEI must be paid to a qualified community development entity (“CDE”),
I.R.C. § 45D(a)(1), acquired at its original issue (directly or through an underwriter) solely in exchange for
cash, I.R.C. § 45D(b)(1)(A), and the CDE must designate the investment as such on its books and records.
Reg. § 1.45D-1(c)(1)(iii). For a corporation, the type of authorized “equity investment” can include any
stock, except certain preferred stock. Excluded is nonqualified preferred stock as defined in section
351(g)(2) of the I.R.C. The taxpayer investor can be a limited liability company or business trust, which is
taxed as a partnership for federal tax purposes,
24
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that 85% of the gross assets must be so directed, and that the requirement must be
satisfied for each annual period in the 7 years available for the tax credit.34
Procedurally, the program is administered through the Community Development
Financial Institutions Fund (“CDFI”). The application process requires a mini-business
plan prior to certification of acceptance into the program.35 For an overview of the
process and typical parties to a NMTC transaction see attached Table A.
(B)

Definitions as Best Evidence of Congressional Intent to Primarily Benefit
Low Income Residents Not High Income Residents in Low Income Areas

The magnitude of the NMTC distribution begets the question: Who are the real
beneficiaries of the tax credit subsidy? It could be that Congress intended to benefit
whoever desired into move to the low income areas, or rather the low income residents
and its existing businesses, or those equity investors who receive the tax credit. The
answer could be all of the above. The plan could be designed for some and not for others.
And the plan in operation could be at variance with the original intent. This sub-part
concerns the original intent by Congress. The next sub-part treats the program in
operation.
Clearly, one intended beneficiary is the investor because she receives the tax
credit. The NMTC mechanism allows investor groups of all types to provide the funds
that serve the community. But the real issue is a matter of degree. Among those various
potential recipients, who is designed as the “primary” beneficiary of that subsidy? What
if an investor’s appetite for a high rate of return generates a project so expensive only the
wealthy can afford it? A 10 story high priced condominium would be beyond the
economic reach of a low income resident. That core resident is perhaps unwittingly
reclassified from a primary beneficiary to a residual beneficiary, where benefits are at
best trickled down from the condo owner. For such projects, those existing low income
residents are left behind and financially unfed. If the primary beneficiary is the investor
or wealthy new residents to the community, then the reduced benefit to the low income
residents is of little consequence
The NMTC definitions provide sufficient, albeit imperfect, clarity as to the
intended beneficiaries of the program through its definitions. Qualified investments, by
definition, are designed to benefit a “low income community”.36 Metropolitan lowincome communities are defined as areas where the poverty rate is at least twenty percent
of the statewide or area median family income, or where the median family income does
not exceed eighty percent of that same state-wide or median income criterion.37 The
statute defines non-metropolitan areas as low-income communities if the median family
income does not exceed eighty percent of the statewide median family income.38 The
34

Reg. § 1.45D-1(c)(5).
Procedurally, an application is filed and reviewed by the CDFI based specified criteria, including the
extent of past assistance to disadvantaged businesses or communities I.R.C. § 45D(f)(2)(A).
36
Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(1)(i) provide that the qualified equity investment is funneled through the CDE into a
low income community project.
37
New Markets Tax Credit, 26 U.S.C. §45D(e)(1)(A) (2000).
38
Id. § 45D(e)(1)(B)(ii).
35

11/22/2006

7

statute also incorporates targeted populations, as defined by the Riegle Community
Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994, into the definition of lowincome communities.39
Importantly, the low-income definition captures not only financial poverty, but
also the lack of access to capital—a pervasive problem in perpetuating poverty.40 It is
therefore clear that NMTC program envisions primary assistance to a “target population”,
and that target population is those who have suffered the effects of poverty. It is only that
group within the community who has lacked historic access to capital. If Congress had
intended to target the financially well healed, it would have expanded the definition,
instead of limiting it to those who have a lacked access to capital.
Beyond definitions of the target population, other indicia of intended beneficiaries
are from examining the role of each party to the transaction. The requirement that the
CDE must have low income residents on advisory boards,41 that 85% of the gross assets
of the CDE must be devoted to low income communities,42 and a mechanism is in place
to funnel the equity funds into an active low income community business which derives
its income or services from that community,43 are all prime indications that Congress
intended each party to the transaction is purposely designed as a mere conduit to the
delivery of equity capital to existing low income community residents, not new entrants
without the economic need.

39

Id. See also, 12 U.S.C. 4702(2000) defining targeted populations as low-income or “otherwise lack[ing]
adequate access to loans or equity investments.
40
See generally Daniel M. Leibsohn, Financial Services Innovation in Community Development, 8-WTR
JAHCDL 122 (1999) (describing the need for flexible, accessible capital in low-income communities).
41
I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(B).
42
Reg. § 1.45D-1(c)(5).
43
I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(i-iii).
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Part II
PROGRAM IN OPERATION: GENTRIFICATION
AND PROBLEMATIC PURPOSED PROJECTS
“Observers [of the NMTC industry] suggest that it is
commercial real estate development driven, which raises
questions about whether it will foster gentrification in the
absence of careful community planning”44
If Congress truly intended the primary beneficiaries of the NMTC program to be
the existing low income residents, the question becomes is the program in operation
fulfilling that intent? If, as depicted in the previous section, an investor can receive the
tax credit subsidy for building a 10-story condominium at purchase prices beyond the
economic reach of low income residents, is the program too broad in operation? The
model that permits the above-described project is, respectfully submitted, up-side-down.
As advocated throughout this article, the type of project should be decided not based on
what is most profitable to the investor, but what most meets the needs of the community.
Thus, I attempt an analytical construct for a tax credit policy that prioritizes those low
income residents, placing them in the front of the line with a chair at the tax planning
table as full fledged participants in the NMTC program. 45
The answer in my view does not start with my above conclusion, but rather with
an analysis of the type of model actually used by those who administer the program, the
CDFI. Whether by design or fiat, the CDFI has at least two conceptual choices. As
described below there is a “place-based” concept that targets people in a particular place,
and a “pure people” concept, targeting people regardless of residency. Congress has
historically offered various forms of subsidy from tax revenues to eliminate urban
blight.46 Enterprise zones and the NMTC program are both generally designed to reduce
poverty in low income areas through economic growth.47 But the methodology to
accomplish that goal differs. The enterprise zones utilize a “place-based” policy, meaning
the zones are designed to revitalize a place, i.e. the urban core communities, “in order to
help local residents”.48 The underlying theory is that “people cannot be separated from
place, and …an antipoverty strategy needs to treat individuals in the context of their

44

Susan R. Jones, Will New Markets tax Credits Enhance Community Economic Development, 8 J. Small &
Emerging Bus. L. 229, 237 (2004). Indeed, those observers who questioned whether commercial real estate
projects were the apple of investor’s eye have an answer. According to CDFI’s own statistics, “61% of the
NMTC proceeds will be used to finance and support real estate projects…” (available at
http://www.cdfifund.gov/awardees/2005/2005NMTC-FAQs.pdf).
45
This is not to say those who have significant financial resources from whatever residency source should
be excluded from any role in urban revitalization. There are various private industry programs and other
federal subsidies available for development in inner cities. But here elected federal representatives of the
American taxpayers earmark public funds to be used to revitalize low income areas and residents of those
areas, who are more in need of dialysis machines than movie theatres, qualitative grocery stores than
Starbucks, and simply houses rather than opera houses. The model that follows is designed to more
effectively use the NMTC subsidy to meet those needs.
46
Harden, supra n. 2, at 5.
47
Forbes, supra n. 22, at 177.
48
Id. at 193.
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community.” 49 The method of the empowerment zones and related programs50 was to
provide skill training and counseling to local residents so they would “also benefit from
the revitalization of the area through employment opportunities and improved social
structures.51
The NMTC law52, unlike Enterprise Zone legislation, is less clear and has fallen
into a conceptual conundrum. The stated purpose of the NMTC is consistent with the
goal of primarily benefiting the core low income residents.53 Notwithstanding the
apparent congressional purpose, the NMTC program in operation appears to be designed
to enhance economic development – but not necessarily for the local residents. This is a
policy for economic growth of a geographic area, even if the growth benefits primarily
those who came in from outside that area. 54 As one commentator observed, the NMTC
program “does not focus on the economic well-being of local residents as one of its
primary goals…no incentives exist to target jobs or services towards local, low income
residents…Instead the program looks to improve the economic well-being of individuals
extending far beyond the defined area.”55 And most poignantly, NMTC scholars
conclude that the NMTC has been focused on “targeting a geographic space and not
necessarily the needs of the people within that space”. 56 Thus, the NMTC does not
foretell economic mobility to low-income residents through job placement and fails to
address other issues such as schools, job training, and housing that are key components in
the attainment of long-term economic success.”57 This falls within the “pure peopleoriented” strategy which advocates assistance to people regardless of where they live,
thereby increasing human capital and mobility since the benefits would follow them
regardless of where they relocate. 58

49

Id. at 193.
After fist and starts early in the Reagan administration, Congress passed legislation in 1987 and
established 100 enterprise zones that remained largely ineffective due to a lack of tax incentives until
spurred into action after the Los Angeles Riots of 1992 under the Clinton administration. Only then was
emphasis placed on tax credits and coordinated federal resources through Social Services Block Grants. In
1993, Clinton signed legislation that established nine enterprise zones and ninety-five enterprise
communities. Through a competitive bidding process additional rounds of zones were created in 1998 and
2001. See Forbes, supra n. 22, at 183.
51
Id. 194.
52
The law is codified in primarily two areas, statutorily in I.R.C. § 45D, and the accompanying
Regulations, Reg. § 45D.
53
The statute states its purpose is to provide a “qualified equity investment” I.R.C. § 45D(b) for “target
populations,” I.R.C. § 45D(e)(2), within the “low income community”. (I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1). The
regulations generally state the purpose of the federal subsidy (tax credit) is to be an incentive for investors
to provide equity capital into projects designed to serve the “low income community” and “low income
residents”. Reg. § 1.45D-1(d). As this article reveals, the bedeviling issues of purpose and fulfillment
thereof are in the details.
54
Forbes, supra n. 22, at 177.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id at 194-195.
58
Id at 195 citing Helen F. Ladd, Spacially Targeted Economic Development Strategies: Do they Work? 1
CITYSCAPE 193, 196 (1994).
50
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The two opposing models are illustrated below:

Non-Core Beneficiary
Core Area

People-Oriented
(Regardless of Place)

Core Beneficiary
In Core Area

People in
Place
Oriented

The most fundamental difference between the two models, in my view, is in the
intended beneficiaries. The People-Oriented model that targets the space but not the core
residents of that space allows the intended beneficiaries to be anyone, regardless of the
relationship to the low income community. If the NMTC program is flexible enough to
allow projects that only high income people can afford, the intended beneficiaries
become only those who can afford the projects developed, e.g. the earlier 10 story
condominium illustration. As such, a model is in essence a subsidization of gentrification
by another name, where the financially well healed can claim as its ‘new market” a core
urban area. I maintain that the People-Oriented model, therefore, is ill-conceived as a
means to primarily benefit low income residents, as Congress intended.
The evidence of whether this model is operational in the NMTC program is
shown by following the money. If the project’s goal is to primarily benefit financially
well healed new entrants to the community, and the NMTC program endorses that focus,
upscaling projects can be authorized. If on the other hand, the intended beneficiaries are
the existing low income residents, then the only authorized projects are likely to be such
projects as health care facilities for the ills most acute to the existing low income
residents, affordable housing for the elderly and chronically financially distressed,
innovative non-conforming loans and financial services for those who lack access to
capital, and charter schools for local children. If the NMTC program allows both, it
misses the mark – if the mark is indeed to assist the core low income residents. Scholarly
discussion of the historic and recurring failure of urban redevelopment points to this same
root cause, where the conceptual model of redevelopment planners does not start with
low income residents as “clients” of the redevelopment. Instead, the focus is on luring
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white citizenry back to the cities.59 It does not take sophisticated empirical analysis to
predict that a revitalization plan for an area that does not make those residents the
“client” does not appear well designed to solve the problem.
To determine whether the CDFI authorizes the People-Oriented gentrification
model, I examined descriptions of award winning projects. I also examined websites of
CDEs that were given allocations. Many entities that have received allocations have not
declared a precise project.60 But of the identified projects in each round of NMTC
awards, approximately $2 billion of tax credit subsidy has been allocated to projects that
appear to be designed primarily for those already with the very access to capital that the
low income residents lack.61 It is worth reiterating that the “target population” for the
tax subsidy program includes those who historically lacked access to capital.62 Many
projects, particularly those with mixed use project types, include movie theatres,
performing art centers for opera, symphony and ballet, hotels like the Marriott Inn with
connected convention centers,63 museums, upscale commercial office, retail outlets, and
even tourist centers. I have designated these project types as “Problematic Purposed
Projects” because they appear to be inconsistent with the Congressional intent to
primarily benefit the low income target population as defined in the law.
There have been four rounds of allocation awards of NMTC funds.64 A sampling
of those problematic projects is described in amount and type segregated by round in the
attached Table B. Listed below is a summary of the amount of tax credit subsidies
provided to such projects to provide a sense of the cost to taxpayers for authorizing those
types of projects.65
Allocation Year
2002
2003
2005
2006
TOTAL

Problematic Project
Equity Investment
$1.6 billion
$1.1 billion
$744 million
$1.9 billion
$5.3 billion

Problematic Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
$624 million
$429 million
$290.1 million
$741 million
$2 billion (Rounded)

These amounts are subject to adjustments due to the lack of clarity among CDEs
as to exactly how the funds would be used. Many project descriptions include a mix of

59

Benjamin B. Quinones, Redevelopment Redefined: Revitalizing The Central City with Resident Control,
27 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 689, 743 (1994).
60
This conclusion is derived from the author’s review of CDFI documents through four rounds of
allocations.
61
The statistics are from the CDFI’s own profiles of the allocation award winners at http://www.cdfi.gov
and the websites of the Allocatees with press releases concerning the projects.
62
I.R.C. § 45D(e)(1).
63
For example, a NMTC subsidy of $15, 263,157 was allocated in Round III (2005) for a project
investment of $106 million. The awardee was Louisville Development Bancorp, Inc. The purpose is the
construction of a 617-room convention center and hotel, (The Marriott Louisville Downtown Convention
Hotel). See http://www.morethanabank,com/New%20Markets%20Tax%20Credit/winners.htm and the
CDFI allocate profiles at http://www.cdfi.gov.
64
The Rounds were (1) in 2002-2003, (2) in 2003, (3) in 2004, and (4) in 2006.
65
These findings are from the author’s review of the CDFI’s profiles of allocatees. See supra n. 60.
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problematic and proper purposes, though the vast majority of project types and costs are
associated with the problematic projects.66
Are subsidized gentrification projects necessarily antithetical to assisting low
income residents? Are “Problematic Purposed Projects” a natural and predictable
byproduct of gentrification? Or conversely, are gentrified projects a primary benefit to
low income residents? The answer appears to depend on how gentrification is defined
and characterized. Two definitions of gentrification have come to the fore among
scholarly literature. One that considers displacement of low income residents as included
in the definition, and one that excludes displacement. Interestingly, those two definitions
have their conceptual roots in the same two models discussed above for urban renewal
through economic revitalization - the “People-Oriented regardless of Place model, and
“People in Place” model. Scholarly debate on whether gentrification is an adverse or a
positive influence on the core residents breaks down philosophically on the basis of
which urban revitalization model is employed.
Like the People in Place model where the benefits inure to the core beneficiary in
the core area, those who define gentrification as a displacement of low income residents
employ the theory of unity between the place and the existing residents, so the benefits to
the place must also include benefiting primarily the people already “in place”.67 Under
this view, the influx of new wealthy residents is viewed as adversely affecting those
existing low income residents.68
A contrary definition of gentrification excludes “displacement” as part of the
definition, and instead refers to gentrification as a “process by which people of higher
incomes move into lower income urban areas and seek to change its physical and social
fabric to better meet their needs and preferences.”69 The needs and preferences targeted
are those of any persons, not just those who are existing residents in place. This is
conceptually aligned with the People-Oriented model. That model targets anyone who
can afford the market prices and it is their “needs and preferences” that are prioritized,
not the poorer existing residents. The beneficiary under this definition can include
anyone, including of course those new entrants to the community without having to tie
the existing low income residents already in place. Under this theory, gentrification has a
positive impact. This later theory does not ignore displacement but does not blame
gentrification. The displacement culprit is the government, for its persistent failure to
produce sufficient housing for the poor.70
The flaw of this non-displacement view is the same as the Pure People model and
other historic urban revitalization missteps discussed above. Just as urban revitalization
66

The amount is subject to a potentially large upward adjustment since a significant number of the CDFI
profiles did not specify any project types. The larger projects include the hotels, convention centers, opera
houses, etc. beyond the types of projects I consider to be properly purposed. A downward adjustment is
also likely since it cannot be determined from the published materials the percentage mix between the
gentrified projects and those truly designed for low income residents. Many projects have a combination of
both. It appears the greatest dollar volume will be to build the largest projects, which again appear to be
problematic.
67
John A. Powell & Marguerite L. Spencer, Giving Tem the Old ‘One-Two: Gentrification and the K.O. of
Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color, 46 HOWARD L.J. 433-435 (2003).
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Id.
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J. Peter Byrne, Two Cheers for Gentrification, 46 HOWARD L. R. 405 (2003).
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has lacked success for failing to prioritize the needs of the “client” urban residents over
the wants of the wealthy who seek to rediscover this marketplace, gentrification
definitions that exclude displacement similarly fail to prioritize the client – the low
income resident. It is the client low income resident that suffers the displacement. And to
reassign blame to the government for the cause of the displacement could at best only add
to the burden of government rather than the private sector. To date, that formula has not
proven successful. As stated earlier, the redevelopment plan for the community that
conceptually does not prioritize the existing community residents is not well designed to
revitalize the area.
One proponent of the non-displacement definition concludes that even if the
target is low income residents in place, gentrification is a net gain for the low income
residents.71 Under his analysis, urban residents currently have better employment
opportunities in the suburbs, so increased investment in new shops and services within
the urban community provides more jobs within the urban core. In his view, the increased
level of high end jobs also increases the supply of support jobs for which low income
residents can qualify.72 He also claims gentrification should improve retail and grocery
shopping for low income people,73 though he fails to detail how that would occur if the
majority of low income residents cannot afford the products brought into the target
community for the gentrifiers who have more leisure income to afford those products.
That theory also fails for two principal reasons. First gentrification depends on
trickle down economics. Since Problematic Purposed Projects appear designed to benefit
the financially well healed new entrants to the area, low income residents are merely
incidental beneficiaries of the NMTC program. The benefits for low income benefits
must therefore be residual in nature, a morphed trickle down of benefits from the wealthy
newcomers to the area.
Trickle down economics has not been a user friendly model for those at the lower
rung of the ladder. By definition, the trickle down theory “assumes that by helping
directly already-wealthy person X we will in fact help disadvantaged person Y in a more
sustainable manner than by helping person Y directly.”74 Historical views by scholars of
urban revitalization have well documented the failures of this theory in application.75 The
conclusion is described as follows: “The net result is that a neighborhood of poor people
is replaced by office towers, luxury hotels, or retail centers. The former low-income
residents displaced by the bulldozer or an equally effective increase in rents, must
relocate into another area they can – perhaps – afford.”76 This conclusion is arguably
more normative than empirical. But the same can be said to a greater degree, with less
empirical support, about the notion that greater investment will lead to significant job
growth. As one study concluded the causal connection between capital investment and
job growth among the low income residents is “untested and usually unproven”. 77 And
without sophisticated statistical analysis, can’t we take the equivalent of judicial notice to
71

Id at 406.
Id at 419.
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Id at 420.
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Quinones, supra n. 59, at 724-751.
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Id at 741 and cited references therein.
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observe that if the federal subsidy is used for a $500,000 condominium in New Orleans,
the displaced low income resident of the 9th Ward who could have used an affordable
home project instead, has little or nothing as a trickle down benefit? Isn’t he certainly,
something far less than an operational primary beneficiary? What is the quantified
amount of tax benefits trickling down from a tax subsidy for a $100 million Hilton Inn
and Convention Center when that same 9th Ward used-to-be resident receives perhaps a
$10,000 - $20,000 job? No amount of fringe benefits or other multiplied extensions of
benefits would elevate him to primary beneficiary status. Conversely, there is ample
empirical evidence that redevelopment project areas normally become “gentrifying
markets” without material increase in the quality of life of the low income residents.78
That notion is aligned with the author’s definition of gentrification that is raised below.
A second reason gentrification does not have a positive impact on low income
residents are because of marginalization or squeezing out of existing low income
residents. To illustrate the process of marginalization, assume a low income resident is a
renter, unable to afford to own a home. Assume the owner of the apartment building
faces higher taxes and insurance costs due to increased property values from new
construction or renovations to accommodate gentrifiers. The landlord also believes there
is an increasing market of higher income potential renters. He is likely to increase the
rent to meet the higher debt service and maintain or improve profitability. The low
income renter has to pay the higher rent charged by a landlord. Assume too the low
income existing resident has static income. Though she may not have to move out – yet –
she nonetheless has been increasingly marginalized because she has less money for other
living expenses due to the effect of gentrification. That rising rent scenario has been
termed “secondary displacement” or “indirect displacement” 79 As one study concludes,
paying higher rent without a corresponding increase in personal welfare is a negative
effect of gentrification. This assumes that the gentrifier wants are different than the core
residents needs. While certainly there are some harmonious projects, there appear to be
an alarming number of circumstances where subsidized projects designed for gentrifiers
appear incompatible with the core resident needs and therefore at variance with the goals
of the NMTC legislation.
In sum, the likely failure of trickle down economics and the more likely
marginalization of low income residents stand as detriments and unintended
consequences of gentrification that dwarf the above-claimed benefits to the low income
residents of the non-displacement definition of gentrification. Since I believe a definition
should incorporate the elements that give the term its character, or give attribution to
what it affects, I define gentrification more broadly than either of the previously
described definitions.
This article views gentrification as having two definitional components. First
there is an influx of new residents with resources significantly beyond the existing
residents. Second, and most importantly, the potential infusion of new residents must
motivate landlords and commercial owners to upscale properties to accommodate the
accoutrements of opulence of the new residents. This definition establishes a causal
connection to a sustained displacement or marginalization of existing urban low income
residents. Under this definition, it is the conversion of resources, not merely the infusion
78
79
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of people that is the cornerstone of gentrification.80 New residents could conceivably go
to the same video stores, churches, and grocery stores as the existing residents without
causing a displacement or marginalization of those existing residents. Existing business
owners could conceivably maintain affordable rents, menu prices, and the government
could establish rent subsidies to minimize rising housing costs for the poor and elderly. It
is only when landlords, owners of vacant and dilapidated housing, restaurant owners, and
the like start what I will call “upscaling”, so that the life style of the new residents
becomes entrenched to the economic and quality of life detriment of the existing
residents that gentrification becomes operational.
The definition is also race neutral. No preference is provided based on race or
ethnicity.81 Under this definition therefore, new residents with wealth, regardless of race
or ethnicity, could bring resources to the community and feed into the existing cultural
lifestyle, maintain affordable housing, contribute to the charitable causes that improve the
living quality of life of the existing residential base, and gentrification still has not
occurred. But if the new infusion of residents also brings with them facilities to
accommodate a standard not affordable or desired or of primary benefit of the existing
community, gentrification is in process.
Under this article’s gentrification definition, the failure to account for
displacement allows the thwarting of congressional intent in passing the NMTC
legislation and would ignore two fundamental principles that I assert are important in
developing the revitalization model for tax credits: (1) prioritizing needs of the most
needy over the wants of the wealthy and (2) identification of the intended versus
incidental beneficiaries. If federal funds are intended to primarily meet the needs of poor
urban residents, then the more such funds are used to instead accommodate the wants
(accoutrements of opulence) of new entrants, there is a diversion of funds that pushes
revitalization opportunities further away from those intended low income residents –
hence a marginalization rather than mainstreaming of tax benefits.82
Of course there is a continuum of project uses that may benefit the target
populations and low income communities at some level. Low income residents could
potentially enjoy an opera or a visit an art gallery if they could afford the prices of the
pieces, or taking in a movie during leisure time. And certainly some target low income
residents could benefit from commercial office space, if they could afford to rent an

80

One definition of gentrification is “the displacement of low-income individuals by young affluent
homeowners as they ‘discover’ downtown residential areas, renovate homes, and thereby raise rents.”
Quinones, supra n. 59, at 748. The essence of gentrification, in my view, is the conversion of the area,
which has more of a genesis with those who owned and made the property available, than those who decide
to move in. The starting point is not therefore with the affluent, young or not, who buy the property. Rather
it is those who increase the rents, or built the luxury condominiums who are more the proximate cause of
the conversion.
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Constitutional issues could be raised, but is beyond the scope of this article. A brief discussion of race
neutrality in the article’s CDFI-required needs assessment is discussed infra, note 103.
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Id at 414-415, citing Jacob L. Vignor, Does Gentrification Harm the Poor?, BROOKINGS-WHARTON
PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 133, 167-168 (2002). It is important to note that gentrification is a group dynamic,
descriptive of a group experience. So a single homeowner that benefits from appreciation on sale of the
residence does not mean that gentrification is not occurring. It is rather a matter of degree. The extent of
damages to the poor due to gentrification is beyond the scope of this article, as empirical proofs would be
required. The issue treated in detail in other published materials. See Powell, supra n. 67.
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office and had a job to make it reasonable to occupy it.83 And a condominium would be
wonderful if the low income target population could afford the mortgage. And some jobs
could flow from the new commerce created in the area. But such uses are not well
designed as primarily for a community and population with third world health care,
chronic unemployment and over 50% drop out rates among its male youth,
unprecedented incarceration of up to 6 of every 10, substandard and overpriced grocery
stores, and a lack of access to the capital to change the circumstance. The salient issue is
whether the people’s tax dollars are used to meet the needs of the low income residents as
earmarked by Congress. These Problematic Purposed Projects do not appear to meet that
purpose.
Another unintended consequence of gentrified NMTC projects is no different
fundamentally than what has been observed by urban demographers as the byproduct of
other urban redevelopment programs – opportunity costs.84 Those costs are substantial
and have been enumerated in prior studies.85 There are physical construction costs. This
refers to actual construction that was ineffective at meeting resident needs, and thereby
precluding construction that would have been better suited.86 In theory it is akin to the
property appraisal concepts of the failure to build based on the “highest and best use” for
the site. Also prominent is the lost time and effort of governmental actors for misguided
development projects. The staff time, including the huge resources associated with
negotiating with private developers, creating and evaluating feasibility reports, holding
public hearings and then analyzing and publishing materials therefrom are all costs for
gentrified projects that miss the mark.87 There are also costs from the nationalization of
project types, where the cookie cutter format of office buildings, high-tech developments,
hotel-convention centers complexes, inter alia, have replicated themselves as a matter of
policy. That policy also replicated and compounds the error since in many cases, the
construction would have occurred in any event and the subsidies were not needed.88 The
more obvious and devastating personal costs are to the low income residents themselves
who suffer the inordinate risk of displacement or marginalization.89
Will the gentrification and Problematic Purposed Projects develop in areas
devastated by Hurricane Katrina? In the most recent of the four rounds of allocations,
$600 million is specifically allocated for use in such areas, defined as the Hurricane
Katrina Gulf Opportunity Zone (“GO Zone”).90 From the inception of the program, there
have been over 230 entities created under the internal revenue code to receive the subsidy
83

The office rents and condominium prices for a vast majority of the projects is
unavailable as many projects have not released data or have yet to finalize plans in that
regard. But from the data gathered to date, a multitude of projects are at least
“problematic” and appear common sensical beyond the intended purpose of the NMTC
program.
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Id. at 742-743.
88
Id. at 744.
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to help the urban core. Less than a handful of those entities are African American
owned.91 For cities like New Orleans where nearly 70% of the city and the vast majority
of the displaced residents are African American, the entities receiving federal subsidies
for reconstruction therefore do not include them.92 And though the majority of those
entities with GO Zone awards have not identified specific projects,93 many have included
the same type of general descriptions that brought gentrified projects to other urban core
residents in the prior 3 rounds.94
For example, the Chevron NMTC Fund LLC received an allocation of $50
million for the GO Zone.95 The Chevron plan is to use the federal subsidies to help
construct “hotels, office space, retail, light industrial and mixed-use buildings” 96 Who
are they building the projects for? It is far from pure speculation to surmise that the hotels
are not primarily for the displaced low income residents. I suspect they will not be asked
in Homeland Security fashion to be permanent hotel guests. I suspect they may receive
janitorial jobs that trickle down from the multi-million dollar developments. But is the
bulk of the $50 million likely to be used for affordable housing complex, replete with
nearby grocery stores and health care facilities designed to meet the needs of the low
income residents the subsidy was designed to assist?
Not all CDEs with Katrina GO allocations are problematic in purpose. A very few
have described what I term Properly Purposed Projects like Capital Link, Inc.97 They
received a $15 million allocation which they assert will be used to provide “Federally
Qualified Health Centers” to the actual low income residents and the uninsured. That is a
dramatically different purpose and intended beneficiary than a hotel project, which by
very definition is designed for the wealthy owners of the facility. The low income
residents who likely cannot afford the occupancy rates have at best residual benefits.
The focus of this article, however, is not confined to exposing misguided projects.
The next Part also presents an analytical construct to proliferate projects truly designed
for the low income communities and their corresponding target populations. Such
projects already exist within the NMTC program. They primarily involve community
healthcare facilities, financing for non-profit community based organizations, child care,
social service centers, community development real estate projects, senior centers,
providing below market nonconventional unsecured commercial loans, and affordable
housing for truly low income residents. These project types are termed “Properly
91

Two Hundred thirty three CDEs have received allocations as of June 29, 2006 according to CDFI
announcements on its website at www.cdfi.gov. The CDFI published Profiles describes 3 entities as being
majority or 100% minority owned, although one of which is an LLC, and the general partner is actually the
award winner that may not be a minority concern.
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Purposed Projects” because author believes are most precisely within the intent of
Congress when the NMTC legislation was passed.
The NMTC legislation was also thoughtful enough to build into the program a
monitoring and evaluation process.98 There are various actions that the CDFI can take to
ensure that the allocations are properly made to appropriate entities. Part III of this
article attempts to assist in that effort as the CDFI assesses the impact of the new markets
credits on low-income communities.

98

Not later than January 31 of 2004, 2007, and 2010, the Comptroller General of the United States must
report to Congress, pursuant to an audit, on the NMTC program, including all qualified community
development entities that receive an allocation under the credit.
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Part III
The Gentrification Alternative The Properly Purposed Project
Developed through Harmonious
CDE and QCB Entities
As noted above, some commentators argue that gentrification is a net gain for low
income residents. If that theory is true in all cases, then the use of NMTCs for such
developments as opera houses, high priced condominiums, and convention centers would
also benefit the urban poor. The reality, however, is more complicated. The extent of
benefits to a low income community, some tangible, some intangible, are a matter of
degree and difficult to quantify. And if it is just a matter of degree, then all projects have
at least some level of indirect or residual benefit. Assuming that to be the case, the
precise question is whether the NMTC federal funding scheme mandates that the tax
subsidy is only for those projects that make low income urban residents the primary
beneficiaries. And if Congress intended low income residents to be primary beneficiaries,
and Problematic Purposed Projects as vehicles for gentrification create a mismatch, what
regulatory amendments are necessary to match the program’s operational reality with
congressional intent? The answer to those questions starts with a conceptual model, a
way of thoughtful problem solving, which is discussed in this section. Specific proposed
amendments follow in Part IV.
Transactional End Sum Model
The NMTC purposes may well be served by first starting with identifying an
achievable outcome, and then building the means to meet that end. A similar model
already exists and has had significant measurable success in the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation.99 In the NMTC context, the desired outcome is two-fold: identify a need in
the community and a specific project designed to meet that need. The starting point in my
model is a list of priorities for the types of projects that the target community needs most.
There is a plethora of statistical data on the extent of disparity between the urban core
cities and the general population, subdivided by health, employment, and virtually every
other category that the United States Census tracks.100 Moreover, Congress is fully
capable of establishing a commission to perform a needs assessment so that it can state at
the end of the day: “These are the needs, and these are the types of projects we believe
are designed to meet those needs”.101 I term the needs list a “Mall of Needs” akin to a
strip mall with various business types within it. The projects designed to meet those
needs I term “Properly Purposed Projects”. The Mall of Needs is based on the premise
that the low income core urban residents would rather have quality grocery stores at
99

A more detailed discussion of The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation is set forth in Section 2 regarding
social entrepreneurship.
100
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affordable prices to feed their households than a Starbucks. They, I will assume, prefer
qualitative health care clinics specializing in the types of illness that disproportionately
affect core community residents (e.g. sickle cell, kidney failure) to an upscale
commercial office building.102 It would be nice to have it all, but the priority assumed in
this article is for the needs, subrogating the wants.103
Currently, the NMTC program has thoughtfully created criteria by which to
evaluate fund applicants104 but it has not publicly released such a needs assessment. Nor
has it published prioritized project types. That void allows latitude for gentrification
projects that would not otherwise have been authorized if there was a template of needs
and project types, and adherence to that standard in the certification process. If this
paradigm shift occurs, it will be clear to NMTC applicants that the privilege attached to
the credits only inures to those who meet criteria consistent with a Mall of Needs for low
income residents rather than a Mall of Wants for gentrifiers.
102

See Nancy Krieger, Painting a Truer Picture of US Socioeconomic and Racial/Ethnic Health
Inequalities: The Public Health Disparities Geocoding Project, American Journal of Public Health, Vol.
95, No. 2, p. 312, 317 (2005), for findings that poor health among low income communities is attributable
to, inter alia, inadequate “public goods (e.g. supermarkets, health clinics) and environmental pollution.”
Segregation has also increased health disparities. According to the Krieger study, “Also pharmacies in
segregated neighborhoods are less likely to have adequate medication supplies, and hospitals in these
neighborhoods are more likely to close.” Id. at 330.
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government are subject to strict scrutiny, and are only constitutional if narrowly drawn. Grutter v Bollinger,
et al, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). None of the amendments offered in this article (e.g. raising the minimum
poverty rate) attempt to add a “racial” classification or preference. An Ethnivestor can be of any race that
has cultural connectivity with the low income community. The low income community may have a mix of
ethnic groups, including immigrant enclaves. Cultural sensitivity is not synonymous with a particular race.
Under all proposed amendments, any investor, CDE or QCB can, for example, determine whether certain
needs are unmet within the community. Ethnivestors may be more attuned to the issues and provide a more
culturally sensitive application to the CDFI. An Ethnivestor may therefore be more likely to propose a
Properly Purposed Project. But no governmentally imposed classification or preference is given because of
race. If a needs assessment must be performed, but without proscribing a governmental preference or
establishing a racial classification, it should be considered “race neutral” in this author’s view. The
preferences should arise as a matter of course in the private marketplace of empirical research. In other
words, if a regulation states: “The CDE shall perform a good-faith needs assessment based on statistical
data publicly available,” and if there is no sickle cell treatment center for a community that has a high
incidence of that disease, that need should be identified and included in the needs assessment. That does not
necessarily mean that particular need must be the CDE’s designated project. But since the CDFI has a
statutory duty to implement a program to assist low income residents in their community, the CDFI should
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the project fails to meet any identified need in the community, then the applicant should be provided the
opportunity to receive the subsidy. Even if proposed amendments are considered race conscious
classifications, the language could be carefully crafted to be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling
governmental purpose. Nonetheless, determining what is or is not a race-conscious governmental provision
is debatable and beyond the scope of this article.
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applicant is then given a numeric score and ranked. See Notice of Allocation Availability, 69 FED. REG.
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It is not enough to merely identify needs and conforming project types. It is also
important to conceptually align the parties to the transaction. A business transactional
approach is herein suggested because most fundamentally the program is about
structuring transactions among various parties. Investors deliver a particular product (i.e.
equity capital) to a particular location (i.e. low income areas) for particular beneficiaries
(low income residents). As with any business transaction, each party has separate
interests, and the success of the transaction depends on establishing a win-win
environment for all those who participate in the transaction. That requires a
comprehensive connecting of dots involving all the component parts and players in the
program. A model that simply fulfills the investor’s financial expectations but leaves the
small business in ruins does not adequately incorporate and harmonize the interests of
each part of the transaction. Nor does it most effectively meet the goal of the subsidy.
To harmonize the interests of each party to the transaction, this modeling involves
two hybrid components: a “means-ends factor” and a “balancing of interests” factor. The
means end factor is a process whereby the applicant is first provided the Mall of Needs
and the list of Properly Purposed Project types.105 Those combined items constitute the
End Sum Interests. Only with that End Sum in focus is the transaction devised. The
parties to the transaction, (the investor, CDE, and the QCB) comprise a “Means Team”
because they collectively are the means by which the “end” is achieved. That end is the
Properly Purposed Project for the target community. The concept is that if the Means
Team is required to first focus on the End Sum Interests, there will be a natural weeding
out of those parties that would otherwise attempt to establish gentrifier projects.
The second component of the transactional model is the balancing of interests.
That component has two aspects – a balance internally among the Means Team, and
externally between the Means Team and the target community. Internally, each team
member should balance its own profit motive with the philanthropic motive of assisting
the target community. If the CDE desires a rate of return at odds with the expectations or
distribution of benefits to the small business (QCB), the discord could lead to severing
the relationship. A failed venture also diminishes the value of the tax credit since the
revitalization did not occur. To avoid a loss of benefits from the tax subsidy dollars, the
CDFI should scrutinize the relationships for signs of incongruence.106 Of course, projects
can have a relative level of success without complete failure, and it is not necessarily an
either/or proposition. But it is not a proper balance if the kind of projects that are
authorized are conceptually upscaling without also reaching down to bring the
community with it.
External balance refers to the need to carefully weigh interests of the collective
Means Team against the interests of the target community. A conceptual model that
allows too heavy a weighting of benefits to the Means Team, e.g. an investor that expects
an unrealistic return on an investment rather than the community interests is more likely
to produce a project deliverable that is a Problematic Purposed Project. A Means Team
that intends to drain the resources of the small business that initially received the equity
105
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funds and then immediately sell the property at the conclusion of the tax credit period is
not properly balanced transaction between the respective interests of the community and
the Means Team. Conversely if the model is too heavily weighted in favor of the
community without sufficient financial attraction to the investor and other members of
the Means Team, the equity supply could wither and die, without a nourishing vine to the
community. A philosophical or investment disconnect between the Means Team and the
target community is a prescription for potential failure. The balancing of interests is
therefore vital to the “win-win” circumstance required to meet the congressional purpose.
This transactional entity purpose model is therefore a hybrid approach between MeansEnds and Balance of Interests.
The model is graphically illustrated below.

Target Community’s PPP
(End Sum Interests)

Investor-CDE-QCB
(Means Team)

External Between Means Team
And ESI

Internal
Among Means
Team Members

Balance of Interests

The CDFI has a certification system that is rigorous in many respects. But if the
balancing of interests and Properly Purposed Projects are to be systematically part of the
NMTC program, amendments to existing publications and regulations should be
considered. The published advice from the CDFI on how to become a CDE does not
mandate how the CDE, QCB and the target community relationships should be
structured.107 There are numerous possibilities, as it should be. However, with flexibility
comes the opportunity for abuse or circumvention of intended purposes, particularly if
the purposes themselves are ambiguously stated. The IRS regulations exist to provide
clarity and close unintended loopholes in determining tax liability and tax credits. They
often include examples to elucidate its interpretation of the statutes. The NMTC statue it
part of the internal revenue code, with regulations. Consistent with this article’s purpose
of adding clarity and closing loopholes, the published materials and regulations should
also provide models examples to guide investor taxpayers in clarifying the conditions
107

The CDFI guidance on the CDE certification is found on its website at http://www.cdfifund.gov.

11/22/2006

23

under which the tax credit is availing. This model could be part of a suggested set of
ways in which the three parties to the “transaction” can conceptualize how they are to
relate to each other to develop a project. The Regulations could also state that each
applicant is expected to state how it intends to match the Mall of Needs with a Properly
Purposed Project and how each party to the transaction will contribute to that end. As
with other recommendations within this article, this model is designed to narrow the
qualified entities and investment vehicles to more precisely accomplish the statutory goal.
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Part IV
Proposed Amendments to Close Loopholes
As noted in Part II, there are competing models for who are the intended
beneficiaries of the NMTC program. One focuses on people in place within the target
community, while the other benefits people regardless of the place of origin. This article
maintains that the people to be primarily benefited fall within the former model so that
the ‘target population” is comprised of low income residents in place within the low
income community. The support for that conclusion includes careful analysis of the
transactions and related definitions. Below are those transactional definitions, the how the
structural process can be amended to close loopholes that have diverted funds away from
the low income residents of target communities.
(1) The Equity Investment and its Correlation with
Qualified Active Low Income Community Business (“QCB”)
The importance of qualifying an equity investment is previously discussed. But it
is not enough to merely have a qualifying equity investment. The CDE must then invest
that QEI into a community project. Though there are at least four different ways an
investment can be structured (i.e. through loans, or loans in combination with cash, and to
different types of entities), that investment must still be designed for low income
residents within a low income community. One prime scenario is when an investment is
made in an entity that provides financial services. The regulations provide that the
services must specifically be to businesses located in and residents of low-income
communities.108 If the intent of the program was for the financially well healed there
would have been no need for federally sponsored incentives to help them get back on
their collective feet. The point is buttressed in the CDFI official announcements used to
announce upcoming allocations. The criteria for awarding allocations includes the
language: “an applicant will generally score well to the extent that it will deploy debt or
investment capital in products or services which: (1) are designed to meet the needs of
underserved markets… (3) focus on customers or partners that typically lack access to
conventional sources of capital”109 The gentrifiers do not typically lack that access to
capital, but have likely thrived because of it.
A second confirmation that low income residents are the primary beneficiaries is
gleaned from the statutory framework for involving businesses within the low income
community. An investment can be made to a “qualified active low-income community
business” (“QCB”). 110 A QCB is defined as an entity that derives over 50% of its
income from within the low income communities. It must also devote a substantial
portion111 of its property, or services from within the low income community.112 The
108

Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(1)(iii).
69 Fed. Reg. 49951 (Aug. 12, 2004).
110
Reg. § 1.45D(d)(1)(A).
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The “substantial portion” test for tangible property or services is satisfied if 40% of the property (owned
or leased) or services is within the low income community. Reg. § 1.45D(d)(1)(B).
112
The specific QCB requirements tied to low income residents are that (1) at least 50% of the QCB’s total
gross income for the year must be derived from the active conduct of a qualified business within any lowincome community I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(i); (2) A substantial portion of the use of its tangible property,
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investment is only qualified if services are performed and income is from within the
target community. So it follows that Congress intended the investment to flow to a small
business that is an integral part of that community. Since the target population is by
definition low income, the investment must primarily serve those low income residents.
It is the nexus with the low income residents that provides the qualifying status, and
should thus be the focus of the investment. That construction would weigh against an
investment in a hotel-convention center complex, for example. It is difficult to conclude
it is designed primarily for the low income residents when attendees and occupants are
non-residents.
The loophole is that an investment in a low income community business is only
one of the types of qualified investments. Other investments can occur without a
required commitment to an enterprise like a QCB with the 50% community income, or
other community services requirements.113 That type of connectivity with the target
community should be required of all entities seeking to qualify for the subsidy. The
convention center would not qualify if the majority of its income were derived from
visitors attending a convention. An opera house would not qualify if the bulk of the
revenue was from outside the community.
(2)

CDE Mission Clarity

The current NMTC statute is ambiguous as to a CDE’s intended beneficiaries. As
noted in the background section of this article, there are three requirements that must be
met for a CDE to be qualified under the NMTC program, two of which are vital to this
discussion. First and most importantly, its primary mission must be serving, or providing
investment capital for low-income communities or low-income persons.114 Arguably the
conjunctive “or” allows a construction that could mean a project for the low-income
“community” is broader than, and equal in status to, a project for low income “persons”.
In other words, a project for an opera house could benefit a broader category of residents
within the “community” like new entrants, who are not low income. A doctor with
income of $400,000 annually who works at an inner city hospital could be within the low
income community, but still not a low income resident. Conversely, if the only
descriptive beneficiaries were “low income persons”, it would far more difficult for the
doctor to be a primary beneficiary of the subsidy.
To avoid ambiguity and to fulfill a goal of qualitative revitalization, this article
recommends that the NMTC regulation simply delete “low income community”. The
benefit should be determined as of the date application for an allocation of funds from the
CDFI is made. Under such a definition, the loophole is closed. Those persons not
experiencing the adverse affects of a blighted condition would not have projects built
primarily for their benefit. The CDFI could then clearly disallow an investment designed
whether owned or leased, must be within any low-income community, I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(ii); A
substantial portion of the services performed for the entity by its employees must be performed in a lowincome community, I.R.C. § 45D(d)(2)(A)(iii). As to entity types, the QCB can be a corporation, (including
a non-profit), a partnership, or a sole proprietor. Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(4)(i)(ii).
113
An investment is still qualified even if it is a loan to another CDE, or purchase of a CDE loan. I.R.C. §
45D(d)(1)(B)&(D).
114
I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(A).
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for a 10-story condominium unit where the minimum price for a one bedroom unit is
$400,000. 115
(3) Demanding an Invitation to Your Own Party
Through CDE Board Influence
The requirement that a CDE must maintain accountability to residents of lowincome communities also provides options that weaken its effectiveness. The
accountability standard is confined to low income resident representation “on any
governing board of the entity or on any advisory board to the entity”.116 Again the
conjunctive “or” allows for ambiguity or a broader interpretation that could weaken the
participatory role of those residents. If a CDE has the flexibility to relegate low income
persons from the target area to a mere advisory board, those residents can be
marginalized by having only advisory powers. Though such funds are designed
specifically for their benefit, the advisory powers are essentially no more than a muffled
voice and virtually no representation on how these important federal funds are used. It
should also be remembered that these same low income residents are taxpayers too and it
is also their money at stake. Under the current regulatory language, a performing arts
center could change its original diverse repertoire of performances to only ballet even if
the majority of low income persons within the low income community vehemently
object. If the advisory board language is stricken, the ambiguity and unintended
consequences go away as well.
Allowing the target low income residents a true voice in project decision-making
also allows a fair chance for eliminating conflicts with gentrifiers before they arise. If the
target residents sign off on projects, the CDE and its investors will presumably only be
able to construct projects the target population already considers acceptable. Thus
gentrifiers are not put in the position of being at odds with the target community. It is
entirely possible that the targeted low income community and gentrifiers actually agree
on certain project types. This regulatory remedy has such potential to be curative,
advisory board provisions should be afforded the same care in drafting as a nonprofit
corporation’s its board of directors. 117
Arguably the question of relative influence of an advisory or even a mandatory
board such language could be left to the parties of each transaction under the
“contractarian” theory. Under that theory the marketplace should be free to establish its
own agreements and the NMTC statute and regulations should be relegated to a default
role, applied only when the agreements of the parties to the transaction are silent on the
relevant issue. 118 The current NMTC regulations and statute appear to operate under that
115

Id.
I.R.C. § 45D(c)(1)(B). The third requirement is that the CDFI must certify the CDE. I.R.C. §
45D(6)(c)(1)(C).
117
Upon election or appointment to a board of director position, a low income community resident would
be imbued with a fraction of management powers of the CDE, including but not limited to the right to
participate in decisions pertaining to the CDE mission, overall policy direction, types of projects that are
consistent with that mission. See the Virginia Nonstock Corporation Act, Code §§ 13.1-803 and Stewart v.
Lady, 251 Va. 106, 110 (1996).
118
Also known as the nexus of contracts model, the theory is that a business organization is most
fundamentally a “nexus of contracts” amongst those who generate goods and services, not a single entity
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model. The CDE and the target residents are left to their own devices and relative
influences on each other to determine just what role the low income community shall
have in decision making for the CDE or the projects it undertakes. There is no statutory
or regulatory mandate as to the extent of low income community participation.
But even when parties are left to their own devices, statutory and regulatory
provisions have historically stepped in when parties use that contractual freedom to
thwart the intent of the legislation or otherwise fail to do what is fair and equitable.119
One analogous circumstance is the Congressional action to curb abusive tax shelters.
Promoters of certain types of transactions took advantage of existing tax laws to create
losses far in excess of the economic reality of the transaction (i.e. losses on paper, but
without any potential financial loss). The use of huge deductions significantly reduced
taxable income far beyond congressional intent.120 To close the loophole and stop the
abuse Congress passed provisions both procedural and substantive.121 Included in the
legislation was the creation of a concept of “potentially abusive tax shelters” where
promoters of tax shelter transactions were required to keep lists of customers and register
shelters with the internal revenue service.122
The federal governmental interest in tax revenues particularly weighs against a
pure contractarian model. An abuse of deductions or tax credits reduces the tax revenue
otherwise owing to the Treasury. That results in less revenue available for public
services, inter alia, which therefore shortchanges the taxpayers. The federal government
has the obligation to direct tax dollars to an intended purpose. In the case of the NMTC
program, if over $2 billion of taxpayer funds are being used as incentives for the wealthy,
rather than the low income residents that Congress intended as beneficiaries, that too is
an abusive diversion of a federal tax dollars. It leaves fewer funds for the intended
purpose of inducing greater private equity into target communities. The lost funds have
multiple adverse affects because those subsidies are also designed to reduce public fund
dependence by those low income communities. The subsidy is only a match to light
private funds designed to increase the quality of life of the target populations. Thus, the
co-opting of funds for a few who are without need increases the federal wasting of
resources, diminishing the value of the taxpayer’s contribution to the Treasury.
Accordingly, certain disclosure requirements or restrictions could be infused into
the NMTC regulation. Akin to the tax shelter concept of protecting against potentially
abusive shelters, the comparable term in this context is the identification of Problematic
Purposed Projects. Based on certain criteria that red flag a potential abusive project type,
created by statute. See Robert W. Hamilton & Jonathan R. Macey, Cases and Materials on Corporations,
including Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies (9th ed., Thompson & West 2005)
and David Rosenberg, Venture Capital Limited Partnership: A Study in Freedom of Contract, 2002
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 363, 367 (2002).
119
To protect Kansas farmers from bogus investments (termed “a piece of blue sky”) the Kansas
legislature passed a security statutory regulation. See Paul G. Mahoney, the Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws:
A test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L. ECON. 229 (2003).
120
See discussion of abusive tax shelters in James J. Freeland, Daniel J. Lathrope, Stephen A. Lind &
Richard B. Stephens, Fundamentals of Federal Income Taxation 498-499 (11TH ED., FOUNDATION PRESS
2000).
121
Substantively Congress disallowed the artificial losses by capping losses from certain income producing
activity or a trade or business to the amount the taxpayer had at risk, e.g. where taxpayer may be personally
liable. I.R.C. § 465(a)(1).
122
I.R.C. § 6112(a)(b).
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the CDFI can be alerted to those CDEs that escaped detection during the application and
allocation process. One such red flag is when a board of low income residents, be it
advisory or governing, objects to a proposed gentrified upscale project. If, prior to
construction of a real estate venture, the CDE was required to submit objections that
reach a majority vote to the CDFI , the disclosures could assist auditors in an
investigation as to whether the project in operation violates the spirit or letter of the
regulations or statute.
Another disclosure requirement could be a mandatory Mall of Needs compilation
by low income residents.123 The Mall of Needs for a target community would be
whatever the community determines to be of greatest need, e.g. affordable housing,
charter schools, pre-school educational facilities, health care clinics for the diseases most
untreated or in particularly acute susceptibility among the residents. With a baseline so
established, a project proposal that varies materially from the established needs would be
subject to a higher level of scrutiny. The threat of losing those credits through required
disclosures, meaningful penalties and enforcement could be an effective deterrent against
the creation of problematic projects.
Even if legislation was not passed to mandate low income residents on a board of
directors, an advisory board with teeth is a viable alternative. The regulations are silent
however on the following:
1. The number of advisory board members (or a corresponding percentage).
2. The criteria for selection of advisory board members.
3. The assurance that recommendations on material issues can be submitted to CDE
decision-makers.
4. Good faith requirements on the CDE to consider advisory board
recommendations.
5. Penalties to the CDE and remedies to the residents if the CDE fails to comply
with provisions relating to the advisory board.
Since CDE and investor decisions are easily based on profit motives and
investment return there is also skepticism as to whether any significant community input
will actually occur. 124 The regulations should accordingly incorporate best practices
models for corporate advisory boards into the NMTC CDE certification requirements,
including those committed to principles of social entrepreneurship.
(4)

The “Qualified Business” Exclusion of Project Types
Outside Core Interest and Needs Assessment.

As will be discussed below, Congress specifically eliminated certain types of
business ventures from being eligible or qualified for the NMTC subsidy. Expanding
those exclusions is recommended in this article. When Congress defined a “qualified
business” under the NMTC program, it excluded the establishment of residential rental
units, i.e. housing projects. 125 Also specifically excluded are businesses that hold
123

See Table C, Properly Purposed Projects.
See Forbes, supra n. 22, at 198, and Dimitri Pappas, A New Approach to a Familiar Problem: The New
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intangibles for sale or license,126 or operate a golf course, country club, massage parlor,
hot tub facility, suntan facility, racetrack, or other gambling facility.127 Also excluded are
highly profitable farming operations.128 In enumerating those exclusions Congress
expressed its intent to eliminate certain types of projects that may fall outside the low
income revitalization. If a type of business cannot be a qualified business it cannot be part
of the chain of transactions that leads to a tax credit. So while rural low income
communities are certainly planned beneficiaries of tax credit investments, Congress
fashioned the law to protect against unintended beneficiaries such as farm businesses that
already have assets in excess of a $500,000.00.129 That is obvious indicia of the intent to
exclude those investors and CDE’s who primarily see dollar signs over help signs for low
income residents. Similarly, golf courses, gambling facilities, and country clubs are
excluded as a matter of congressional urban tax policy. It was congressional judgment
that golf courses and country clubs are not truly designed for the target population of low
income residents.
Congressional judgment could also be used to eliminate other accoutrements of
opulence – venues for opera, ballet, and symphonies, high priced condominiums, art
galleries, hotels, and convention centers - all of which have received the NMTC federal
subsidy.130 To close the loophole for such Problematic Purposed Projects, this regulation
can either simply add those project types to the list of prohibited businesses and/or put a
fair market value ceiling on the project as it did with farming projects. The existing
business operation exclusion could be amended to incorporate the following language:
“Any trade or business where, unless decided otherwise by a mandatory
community board, the principal activity is a venue for opera, ballet,
symphony orchestras, art galleries, hotels, convention centers, mixed use
condominiums, or substantially similar business operations where the
aggregate fair market value of assets owned or leased for the project by
the taxpayer at the close of the taxable year, or on average during the
taxable year exceeds ________.131
Consistent with other regulatory amendments noted above, if such a prohibition
was contained in the Regulations, the CDFI would have a clearer basis for auditing and
eliminating such Problematic Purposed Projects. Since the CDFI is required to monitor
whether its award allocations are used for projects consistent with the congressional
goals, amendatory language should be a valuable asset in carrying out its oversight
function.
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Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(5)(iii)(A).
Reg. § 1.45D-1(d)(5)(iii)(B).
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Id. The provision is that as of the close of the taxable year, the sum of the fair market value of the
farming assets, and the taxpayer’s aggregate value of leased assets exceeds $500,000.
129
Id.
130
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CDEs.
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project history within various low income communities to establish fair market value amounts based on
such factors as project size, target community income level, stated protect types and goals from the target
low income residents through board of director statements, or otherwise.
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(5)
“Low-Income Community” Clarification to
Match Intent to Primarily Benefit Low Income Residents
As previously stated, the NMTC mandates that a CDE must have a primary
mission of serving or providing equity capital for “low income communities or low
income persons”. Similar to the need for carefully drafted definitions of the entities that
prevent unintended consequences, the definition of the low income community should
also be narrowly drawn. As noted above, the definition of low income community could
simply be synonymous with low income residents or be deleted entirely. Then there can
be no doubt that the “community” truly means the existing low income residents of the
community rather than the new financially well healed entrants to that community.
Another amendment to close loopholes in the definition of the low income
community is to tighten the census tract criteria. Currently, a census tract with poverty
rates of 20 percent qualifies as a “low income community” in a metropolitan area.132 If
instead, the poverty rate with a census tract had a floor of 30 or 40 percent of the
community, lower income residents would have to comprise a higher percentage of the
tract to qualify.133 As an additional safeguard, the CDFI could hire demographers with
the type of expertise used to analyze the fairness of federal congressional districts,
pinpointing the percentages of various groups within a district when redistricting issues
arise, to examine questionable circumstances within a census tract. If, as one Federal
Reserve Bank examiner stated,134 there is a narrow segment of high poverty rates within
an otherwise affluent area, this article suggests a case by case review to vary the general
census tract criteria to avoid over inclusiveness. The NMTC statute could be amended to
allow that flexibility in individual cases.
(6)

Increased Accountability
Through Recapture of the Credit

The forgoing proposed amendments to the NMTC law are designed to change
behavior of certain investors and entities, i.e. discourage federally sponsored
gentrification. When changing behavior is the goal of amended language, it is more
likely to be effective as a remedy if the failure to change behavior has adverse
consequences for noncompliance – in a word – accountability. The primary tool in the
existing NMTC law is a recapture (i.e. a retroactive forfeiting) of the tax credit.135
The recapture currently occurs when any of the three following events occur: (1)
the CDE loses its status as such (2) the proceeds of the equity investment to the CDE are
132

I.R.C. § 45D(3)(e)(1)(A).
Observers of the NMTC program in its infancy also recognized the issue. As a Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland examiner stated: “Poverty rates take into consideration the number of individuals in a family,
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improperly used outside of the required use for qualified investment purposes, or (3) the
CDE redeems (takes back) the equity investment for other qualified use.136 Thus, if a
CDE no longer has as its primary mission serving low income persons or the low income
community or the CDE fails to use a low income resident advisory board, it could lose its
status and the tax credits would be recaptured. If the prior suggested amendments were
incorporated in the statute so low income residents must be served primarily without
community definitions expanding beyond them, and the boards truly allow decision
making participation to those residents, then the recapture provides the accountability
standards advocated in this article.
Similarly, if the qualified equity investment (QEI) is only allowed for the
“qualified business” that eliminates the Problematic Purposed Projects, then only
Properly Purposed Projects would be qualified businesses. Any investment in the hotels
and convention centers, and other enumerated upscaling projects of gentrification would
be non-qualified, and the tax credit recapture hammer would fall on the investor. Those
provisions appear to be adequate deterrents to investing in outside of Properly Purposed
Projects. To provide a catch all provision, like a default and termination clause in
commercial contracts, the recapture clause could simply state the failure of the CDE to
comply with provisions concerning Properly Purposed Projects and the target
community’s needs assessment is cause for recapture of the tax credit (default) and unless
cured within a specified time or by certain curing actions, the credit will be lost.
The recapture has teeth built into the statute and appears loophole free, assuming
the proposed amendments are made. The recapture occurs at any time in any tax year
upon the happening of any of the triggering events. The amount of the credit recaptured
increases the investor’s tax, and no deduction is given for the recaptured interest.137
(7)

Safeguards Against Overleveraging the QCB

Since the QCB is the small business within the NMTC program that actually
serves the target community,138 its economic health is vital to efficient use of the
federal tax credit subsidy and achieving the goal of revitalizing the community. Like
most typical small businesses, QCBs are financed with a combination of debt and
equity. 139 There are admittedly some positive aspects of incurring debt.140 Proponents
of debt financing as an incentive to efficiently manage the business have axioms that
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I.R.C. § 45D(g)(3)(A)(B)(C).
The credit recapture amount is the decrease in credits allowed for all taxable years as if the NMTC had
not been granted, plus interest. I.R.C. § 45D(g)(1)(A)(B).
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The QCB is required to derive over half of its income from and provide goods or services to the target
community. Reg. § 1.45D(d)(1).
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essentially state that the challenge of producing sufficient cash flows or default
motivates owners to work harder than counterparts in less leveraged firms.141
This theory has been criticized as an oversimplification since it should not be
assumed that owners or managers are predictably going to respond to this risk by working
harder.142 Indeed, proponents of debt incentives admit “the manager or owner’s fear of
not meeting the debt service (falling through thin ice) does not always lead to superior
performance; it may instead lead to a fatalistic sense that effort might be wasted in a
futile cause.”143
A prime illustration of the dangers of debt is found in the tantalizing quest for
leverage. Leverage is the ability of a borrower to earn more on the borrowed funds that
the cost of the borrowing.144 Overleveraging at its core is the incurrence of debt beyond
the capacity to pay it. Empirical studies reveal that higher goals (e.g. an overly ambitious
high cost real estate development), typically result in the owners carrying higher levels of
debt (“debt service”). To meet that debt service, higher cash flow production is required.
Those cash flow demands can increase the risk of financial failure. And if goals are too
difficult, perceived risks can in turn cause business owners to have a declining
commitment to achieving those goals – a downward spiral where the next project or
financial issue is met with greater reluctance to accept similar goals and a lesser
commitment that those goals can be achieved.145 There is a growing body of literature
that psychological cycles of failure result from such unrealized goals.146 A “falling
through thin ice” syndrome is not uncommon.147
This author’s review of financing structures reveals great potential for
overleveraged QCBs. Many NMTC CDEs require multi-million dollar thresholds for
project size to justify the high transactional fees to law firms, accountants, and
consultants in structuring the transactions.148 Based on a sampling of NMTC allocations
established through the four rounds of awards to date, over 50% of the awards have been
$50 millions or greater, with some as high as $150 million. 149 This author suspects most
QCBs are not currently able to secure the requisite amount of equity financing to compete
at that level, and must rely on debt to participate in the transaction. In many of the
financing structures reviewed, the QCB is essentially a borrower rather than a full fledge
141
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equity partner in the transaction. Some transactions have even placed the QCB in the
position of receiving a 100% loan, and no cash or other equity at all.150 If the CDE sets
project size and cost goals beyond the capacity of the QCB, the QBC is a likely to overly
rely on debt financing. That results in the overleveraging and consequential growing
likelihood of not meeting the goals of paying the debt service with related psychological
downturns in motivation and performance. If the QCB is overleveraged the owners are
more likely to perceive an inability to meet that debt service, and as a result a declining
commitment to the project. The outcome could obviously be a business failure. Thus, a
high debt structure could be anathema to the financial structure of a NMTC transaction.
If failure occurs due to overleveraging, the overall loss is not just an economic
loss of an enterprise, but also the loss of the value of the individuals to the community
(personally and professionally). These “negative externalities” include the destructive
effect of the firm failure on the future motivation and production of that QCB owner.151
The NMTC target community also bears a loss of resource commitment.152 Thus, this
potential loss of the QCB and the firm owners due to “motivational externalities” from
overleveraging of debt should be discouraged “as a matter of public policy.”153
As the NMTC program is a governmental program, funded with public dollars for
a public benefit, it is therefore fair game for CDFI regulation. The CDFI can monitor
debt ratios. It can publicly encourage NMTC applicants to carefully construct a financing
model that does not jeopardize the QCB. The CDFI could even provide the ultimate
incentive of including in its award criteria a review of the CDE’s proposed debt-equity
mix. That would be consistent with also advising the applicants that favorable
consideration would be given to Properly Purposed Projects over Problematic Purposed
Projects. The underlying theory is that if the projects with the greatest benefit to the target
community are smaller in financial scale, there should fewer overleveraged transactions
for the QCB. If the structure appears to be overleveraging the QCB, the CDE applicant
should be viewed less favorably than a CDE applicant that builds a financing model that
minimizes the financial thin ice that unduly puts the QCB at risk of failure.
Implications for Urban Tax Policy
The United States tax system raises revenues from its citizenry in large part on the
fundamental principle that those with a greater ability to pay must pay more than those of
lesser resources.154 That is why progressive tax rates were established, requiring those
with greater taxable income to be in higher marginal rates, paying a greater percentage of
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See the Clearinghouse NMTC, LLC transaction described infra, note 162.
Id. at 1328.
152
Id.
153
Id. at 1329.
154
See William A. Klein, Joseph Bankman & Daniel N. Shaviro, Federal Income Taxation, 6-7 (ASPEN
PUBLISHERS 2003). This “ability to pay” theory could arguably mean a mere convenience in paying where
those with more liquid assets (cash) pay more than those invested in illiquid assets. Under that theory, true
wealth could more easily be disguised and misrepresented. The other notion is the ability to pay is more
directly aligned with overall wealth and well-being. Under that theory, those with greater resources, liquid
or illiquid, pay more because the resources are greater, though it may be inconvenient to retrieve it.
151
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taxable income than those with lesser taxable income. 155 The corollary is that those in
greater economic need are to pay less in federal income tax. If a federal subsidy is
allowed to benefit those taxpayers who have the greater ability to pay, i.e. investors in
gentrified projects who receive the tax credit subsidy, the real benefit flows not to those
in greatest economic need, but those already with wealth and resources. And it is the
average American taxpayer with lesser resources that picks up the tab for the gentrified
multimillion dollar projects by paying for the billions of dollars in subsidy. That was not
likely the intent of Congress when placing the NMTC legislation in the internal revenue
code, and it is inconsistent with long standing principles of federal taxation.
Our tax system does not use the internal revenue code for the singular purpose of
raising revenues for the public good. The Code is also a vehicle for encouraging certain
congressionally approved behavior among taxpayers in accord with certain established
values. Congress, for example, wanted to encourage home ownership. Homeowners
receive a “subsidy” (i.e. deduction) for paying interest on home mortgages and for paying
local property taxes on a home.156 A renter could theoretically receive a deduction, but
the value of renting was not considered as valuable an interest, and thus no deduction to
encourage that activity.
Conversely, Congress has decided that it will not provide tax benefits through
deductions to those who are involved in personal “consumption” expenditures, like a self
employed groundskeeper who may deduct expenses for mowing activities for a golf
course client, but not for mowing his own lawn.157 Similar personal non-deductible
consumption expenditures include the cost of gasoline to buy groceries for the household,
or paying for the grooming of a pet, or paying interest on vacation loans or credit
cards.158 These are generally “wants” not needs. There are exceptions, but those are
typically because Congress determined that though an item was personal, there was also a
higher value in society placed on the item as a “need”, not merely a leisure or
convenience activity generating the expenditure.
A tax credit is a benefit even greater than many deductions.159 But if tax credits
designed for low income residents instead flow to wealthy investors from gentrified
projects the primary beneficiaries will not statutory target population, but rather those of
greater leisure, for their consumptive convenience and wants. That is also inconsistent
with federal tax policy, as formulated historically and as applied in this context.
And while it is arguable that the tax credit incentive could include gentrified
projects to increase tax base and provide jobs, it is wiser policy to narrowly construe
those items that draw down the federal treasury. It is well established that whether
domestic programs are financed with direct expenditures or with tax expenditures in the
155

The progressive income tax exists when the rates of taxation (percentage paid on certain ranges of
income) rise as income rises. So the higher ones income the greater proportion of income is taxed. See Id.
156
See I.R.C. §163(h) for the deduction for interest paid on a principal residence. The Tax Reform Act of
1986 eliminated deductions for interest paid on borrowed money for personal items such as vacations and
automobiles. Real property taxes are a personal itemized deduction under I.R.C. §164(a)(1)
157
For a discussion of the theory of consumption, see Marvin A. Chirelstein, Federal Income Taxation,
184-190 (10th ed., Foundation Press 2005).
158
See I.R.C. §163(a)&(h).
159
Tax credits receive a full dollar for dollar value reduction in tax liability whereas various itemized
deductions that have certain percentage floors or ceilings that reduce the benefit. See I.R.C. § 67 for
miscellaneous deductions and § 68 for deduction examples, and tax credits like the NMTC at I.R.C. § 45D.
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form of exclusions, deductions, or credits, the effect on the federal budget is the same.160
Every credit and deduction takes money out of the Treasury that would otherwise be used
for roads, war efforts, and the handicapped. The more that funds are withdrawn, the
greater the burden on the American taxpayer to provide additional replacement funding,
and the greater the potential for a federal deficit, with the adverse economic
consequences that could follow. Another reason for narrowing the availability of credits
from a tax policy perspective is that tax credits add to the complexity of tax law and can
undermine fairness in the distribution of tax burdens.161
Another rationale for narrowing the tax credit is the evidence that financially well
healed entities would make the investment even without the subsidy. The evidence is
found in analogous tax incentives offered by states and municipalities. Various state and
local tax incentives (e.g. credits for employing local persons, exemptions, and abatements
from property taxes), like federal tax credits, are governmental tax benefits given to
induce the business to invest and do business in a particular venue. Economists, social
scientists, and legal scholars have found only marginal links between a tax incentive and
increased economic activity in the area by large corporations.162 After nearly 30 years of
research, the conventional wisdom is that various other economic factors have more
impact on the investment decision by multistate corporations than the economic value of
the tax benefit.163 A corporate executive has candidly admitted the tax benefits were
merely “a little extra cream on top.” 164 Skepticism abounds as to whether state tax
incentives lure the wealthy corporations with tax incentives is cost effective for the
state.165
The NMTC award winners for many of the gentrified Problematic Purposed
Projects are banks, or subsidiaries of banks.166 In light of the above research, isn’t it also
likely that the NMTC CDEs for problematic projects would also have made the
investment in a multi-million dollar convention center without the tax credit? The same
non-subsidy factors of other corporate executives, like quality of workforce, and
regulatory environment may also be primary decision-making factors for the major CDE.
If lesser cost effectiveness exists among the CDEs of Problematic Purposed Projects, then
offering the subsidy to such entities should be eliminated or minimized. That would free
up the funds for either a reallocation to Properly Purposed Projects or a reduction in the
amount of subsidies. In either case, the efficiency of tax credits is increased.167
160

Adele Robinson, Risky Credit: Tuition Tax Credits & Issues of Accountability & Equity, 11 STAN. L. &
POL’Y REV. 253, 254 (2000).
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Id.
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Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints on State Tax
Incentives for Business, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 377, 391 (1996).
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Much of the study is codified in a New Your Legislative Commission report. The report concluded that
the quality of labor, proximity to markets and supplies, access to utilities, regulatory environment, quality
of education, and the availability of housing are aggregate factors that have greater impact on whether to
invest in a particular city or region. See 51 Albany L. Rev. 393 (1987).
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Enrich, supra n. 162, at 392.
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See Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation: Cases and Materials, 28 (8th
ED., THOMPSON & WEST 2005) for various cited articles.
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Supra n. 63. The Louisville Development Bancorp, Inc., that was allocated funds for building a Marriott
hotel and convention center is just an example.
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Arguably, the non-subsidy factors are also primary for CDEs of Properly Purposed Projects. The
reallocation to those CDEs is still wiser tax policy because the funds are more carefully directed to the meet
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the purposes of the program. The only alternative would be to eliminate the tax credit, which is politically
difficult to justify as an improvement in the quest to revitalize urban and rural low income communities.
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Conclusion
The NMTC program has laudably used tax credit incentives to stimulate increased
equity investment to benefit low income residents. Unintended loopholes have morphed
properly purposed projects into more problematic venues for opera, ballet, symphony
orchestras, hotel and convention center complexes, and high priced condominiums, in
two words - subsidized gentrification. This has occurred in part due to a lack of
conceptual clarity on a required relationship between Means Team and End Project,
where each participant in the NMTC transaction is merely a conduit for delivery of a
product primarily designed for the low income residents, rather than the financially well
healed migrants to that community. The lack of conceptual clarity led to statutory
ambiguity as to the precise intended beneficiaries of the program. And as a result, the
NMTC program continues to incur staggering opportunity costs and a wasting of
resources within the community and the dollars earmarked to assist them.168
Various amendments are proposed to provide the CDFI with additional
transactional controls. Principal recommendations include narrowing the type of projects
authorized so only those well designed to meet established needs of the community
receive the subsidy. A model that first establishes the two-pronged outcome (End Sum
Interests, i.e. a Mall of Needs assessment, and a project to meet those needs) should
systematically weed out the Problematic Purposed Projects. There should also be
increased accountability in capital structure to minimize potential overleveraging of the
QCBs. That should also increase long term equity commitments and business operations
beyond the 7 year tax credit haven. A model for revitalization should incorporate long
term activity and this model is consistent with long term planning.
These may be unprecedented ways to meet the urban crisis, but the crisis is
reaching unprecedented levels. The status quo brings more of the same, and more of the
same does not solve the urban core issues sought to be remedied through the NMTC
program. If the federal government is to provide tax subsidies to influence investment
behavior in urban America, it is wiser tax policy to retain fundamental tax principles, and
refuse to provide tax benefits for the consumptive wants of gentrifiers, when needs of
crisis proportions remain unmet. That diversion of funds and dilution of purpose only
adds to the marginalization and ultimate cost to our society in lost social capital.
A tax subsidy is a benefit paid for with taxpayers’ dollars that comes with a price.
That price for tax credit investors is the foregone opportunity to maximize profits. That
quest is best suited for purely private transaction with purely private funds in play. But
the NMTC program involves public funds that therefore should tie primarily to a public
purpose. The NMTC purpose is the revitalization of the low income community. Closing
loopholes through amendments to the NMTC statute is recommended as a step in the
right direction to accomplish that goal.

168

See discussion of opportunity costs imposed on low income residents from failed trickle down urban
redevelopment, which is in effect gentrification, at Part II.
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Table A

NMTC Summary Graphic*
CDEs must make QLICIs
within 12 months of receipt
of investor QEIs

CDFI Fund

Investing in
or lending to
QCB

CDE
(For profit only)
CDEs must offer credits
To investors within 5 years

Private
Investor

Financial
Counseling

Investing in
or
Lending to CDEs

Purchasing loans
From CDEs

QEI must stay
invested for 7 years
*Figure taken from CDFI Fund NMTC Information Session Handout
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TABLE B
REPRESENTATIVE SAMPLE OF PROBLEMATIC PURPOSED PROJECTS

CDE

Proposed Use
th

Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)

Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)

Allocation
Award Year

$127

$49.53

2002

Received 6 largest allocation.
Center for the Arts: Transform the abandoned
factory into museum space for its world-class
contemporary art collection. Following a $30
million rehabilitation, this 292,000 square-foot
industrial steel, concrete and glass structure is
now home to one of the world’s foremost
collections of works by major artists of the 1960s
and 1970s, including Andy Warhol, Joseph
Beuys, Walter De Maria and Donald Judd.

National Trust
Community
Investment
Corporation

Hippodrome Performing Arts Center: Restore
three historic landmark buildings. The distinctive
exterior cornice and marquee of the original
Hippodrome Theater will be recreated. The 2,250seat center anticipates hosting 200 events a year,
including the Baltimore Symphony Orchestra and
touring Broadway production.
Portland Telegram Building: Includes restoration
of the façade and clock tower and renovation of
33,000 square-feet of space for retail and office
use.
Professional Building: Upper floor offices and
ground floor retail.
Historic Tennessee Theatre: Rehabilitation of the
‘Official State Theatre of Tennessee,’ a 1928
movie palace in downtown Knoxville.
American Tobacco Historic District:
Rehabilitation…into a mixed-use complex, and
4,000-seat theatre.

123 New
Market
Investors, LLC

226-room hotel in downtown Washington, D.C.

$13

$5.07

2002

Louisville
Development
Bancorp, Inc.

Redevelopment of Broadway
Cinemas…development of the Marriott
Convention Hotel…development of Residence Inn
Downtown…construction of a new headquarters
building for CW Johnson Xpress.

$8

$3.12

2005
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CDE

Proposed Use

Phoenix
Community
Development
and Investment
Corporation

A biotechnology campus.

Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)

Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)

Allocation
Award Year

$170

$66.3

2002

$60

$23.4

2005

$24

$9.36

2003

$52

$20.28

2003

$20

$7.8

2006

ICCF Project-Grand Rapids: 5,000 square feet of
commercial space.
Lot 9-Kalamazoo: 113,000 square feet mixed-use
building comprised of 10,000 square feet retail,
48,606 Class A Office and 16,800 square feet of
residential housing.
Pere Marquette Depot: $3.8 million building will be
the regional tourism bureau center.
Michigan
Magnet Fund

1 South Division-Grand Rapids: 40,000 square
feet of retail space and 149 public parking spaces.
Stadium Project-Lansing: Mixed-use development
with first floor retail/office use consisting of 25,000
square feet…36 urban rental units…$800-$1,200
per month.
500 Block-Flint: $11 million 30,000 square foot
restaurant and entertainment complex. Eight loft
apartments…1,500 sq. ft. to 3,000 sq. ft.
Rehabilitation of the old Portland Armory for the
Portland Center Stage.

Historic
Rehabilitation
Fund I

Johnson
Community
Development
Company

Seattle
Community
Investments

“Intent is to transform Portland’s historic, but
unused, Armory building into a world-class
performing arts center. This allows Portland
Center Stage to move out of its current home into
a performance space better suited to its goal of
becoming a top American regional theater
company.”
$4 million to fund a newly constructed office
building, Deer Valley Corporate Center.
Assist The Stockyards Restaurant, a virtual living
museum and local landmark that commemorates
and celebrates Arizona’s cattle industry.
Loans have funded improvements for…world
headquarters for a medical systems company.
60,000 square feet of retail space and 100
apartment units on a four-acre site…transforming
High Point from a blighted concentration of lowincome people into a new, ecologically
sustainable, mixed-income community.
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CDE

Proposed Use

Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)

Urban
Research Park
CDE, LLC

Research parks…universities, colleges, hospitals,
medical schools, and research parks.

$50

$19.5

2006

Affirmative New
Markets, LLC

Bring “real life” to a community. Boston Medical
Center to rehabilitate an historic building on its
campus…to house its information Technology
Group.

$12

$4.68

2003

The purchase and rehabilitation of theaters

$6

$2.34

2002

Office, industrial, tourist, commercial and
residential development projects

$50

$19.5

2002

Lofts…retail and office space, a multi-story
parking structure.

$40

$15.6

2002

Large mixed-use facility (including retail, office
and residential components as well as parking
facilities)

$35

$13.65

2002

$56

$10.14

2002

$10.8

$4.21

2002

The
Association for
Theater-Based
Community
Development
Border
Communities
Capital
Company, LLC
Cahaba
Community
Development,
LLC
Campus
Partners for
Community
Urban
Development
Clearinghouse
CDFI

Local Initiatives
Support
Corporation
(LISC)

$15 million shopping and cultural center in San
Diego called Market Creek Plaza. Amphitheater
for special events.
60,000 square-foot mixed-use real estate
projects…saves historic mill…by rehabilitating
and expanding the existing structure into
residential and commercial space. The project will
house art galleries…wine bar/coffee shop…also
include 36 residential lofts.
Another project: third floor ballroom will be
used…for studio, office and performance space
for itself and other puppet artists…project begun
16 years ago when HOBT renovated the Avalon
Theatre.

Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)

Allocation
Award Year

Rehab of former industrial buildings in Milwaukee
suburb: high quality office building…500,000
square-feet of office and parking space.
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Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)

Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)

Allocation
Award Year

$25

$9.75

2002

14-story office building…office space, ground floor
retail.

$21

$8.19

2002

Commercial real estate projects. 40% of its
activities will be targeted to suburban areas.

$40

$15.6

2002

Retail development and hotel projects…mixeduse commercial facilities…a biotechnology
campus.

$170

$66.3

2002

$80

$31.2

2002

$3

$1.17

2002

$64

$24.96

2003

$50

$19.5

2003

$72.5

$28.28

2003

CDE

Proposed Use
Retail and office space, theaters and performing
arts centers.
New 20,000 square-foot, 4-story office
condominium building.

MHIC, LLC

High quality and attractive commercial space and
housing.
Performance center, office and retail space.
Lofts.

Greater
Jamaica Local
Development
Company, Inc.
Impact
Community
Capital CDE,
LLC
Phoenix
Community
Development
and Investment
Corporation

30,000 square-foot state-of-the-art manufacturing
plant at the Presbyterian Health Foundation (PHF)
Research Park.

REI New
Markets
Investment,
LLC

Cytovance Biologics, Inc. is a biopharmaceutical
contract manufacturing company specializing in
the production of therapeutic proteins and
antibodies from mammalian cell culture.

Southeast
Indiana
Community
Development
Coastal
Enterprises,
Inc.
Harbor
Bankshares
Corporation
Hospitality
Fund I

Hotel…theater…medical arts center
GMRI marine research/education laboratory.
First-class commercial/office space.
The housing and business infrastructure relating
to the development of an $800 million bio-tech
park.
A commercial loan fund to finance large scale
mixed-use projects.
Restore historic retail center of Portland’s
downtown for mixed-use…Premium hotel rooms.
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Problematic
Project Equity
Investment
(In Millions)

Problematic
Project Tax
Credit Subsidy
(In Millions)

Allocation
Award Year

Office and retail space, theatres and performing
arts centers.

$90

$35.1

2003

Enhance or improve upon the current activity of
the Cleveland-Cuyahoga County Port Authority.

$47

$18.33

2003

$15

$5.85

2003

$21

$8.19

2003

$100

$39

2003

$28

$10.92

2005

$90

$35.1

2005

CDE

Proposed Use

Massachusetts
Housing
Investment
Corporation
Northeast Ohio
Development
Fund, LLC
Prestamos,
CDFI, LLC
Southside
Development
Enterprises,
LLC
Wisconsin
Community
Development
Legacy Fund,
Inc.
Biotech
Research
Center, LLC
Local Initiatives
Support
Corporation

Community retail projects, commercial/industrial
development…equity funding for companies in the
life sciences and technology industry.
$15 million will go toward attracting national
retailers to the former Mid City Shopping
Center…attract office and commercial
development to …Business Park.
Finance construction of a nine-story office
building.
Help finance development of a 300,000 square
foot life sciences research facility next to the new
University of Hawaii medical school.
$65 million for mixed-use property that includes
commercial space and 36 loft apartments.
Sophisticated office complex…with 500,000
square feet of office and parking spaces…Many
of the tenants will be in the high tech or medical
services sectors.
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TABLE C
PROPERLY PURPOSED PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS
Below is a sampling of project descriptions that are considered well designed for target
community needs determinations and thus Properly Purposed Projects. The term Properly
Purposed Projects is also an apt label.
“Community healthcare centers”
“Small Business Development”
“Nontraditional financing to support businesses located in low income areas”
“Child care, Head Start and other non-profit facilities”
“Real estate financing to small businesses, non-profit community centers, day
care centers, charter schools, food distributors, health and social service
centers…”
“Projects …designed to be more affordable to end users, so that businesses can
remain in the low income communities”
“Facilities - enhance access for charter schools in distressed areas”
“Economic development to Hispanic Latino communities…originate debt
investments in …nonprofit community organizations.”
“Working capital loans to community based housing developers, and operators of
community facilities, …and senior centers”
[Source: Round Two CDFI Profiles]
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